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Abstract. Agents are autonomous and thus their goals and beliefs can-
not be changed by other agents or the environment, but from outside
the agents we can change their institutional goals and beliefs, that is, the
responsibilities and powers associated with their roles. In this paper, we
introduce a model of institutional dynamics, where the dynamics of an
institution is modeled by the creation or removal of responsibilities and
powers. We illustrate the change of institutional goals and beliefs using
a government scenario.
1 Introduction
Institutions are structures and mechanisms of social order and cooperation gov-
erning the behavior of a set of individuals. However, the formal analysis of the
institutions is challenging due to the complexity of its dynamics. For example,
the institution itself may change over time due to the behavior of the agents. To
model the dynamics of the institution, we use dependence networks developed
by Sichman and Conte [11], as they are used in the early requirement analysis
of Tropos [6].
The research question of this paper is: How to model the dynamics of de-
pendence networks between agents due to institutional change? In our model
presented in [3] we distinguish four views on multiagent systems without mak-
ing institutions explicit. The agent view represents the agents of the systems
introducing conditional goals, such as those goals that can be added by an agent
to another one. The power view is presented as an abstraction of the agent view
and it introduces two functions associating the agents with the goals they can
create to agents and with the goals they can achieve. The dynamic dependence
view is defined as an abstraction of the power view. In the model of [3], de-
pendencies can be created by a set of agents making sets of agents dependent
on each other, thanks to the power to trigger conditional goals. In this paper
we present an extension of this model with also removal of dependencies. The
challenge of the present paper is to explain how on the one hand agents are
autonomous and, thus, their goals and beliefs cannot change, but on the other
hand, the dependences between agents can change in an institution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the running example,
Section 3 and 4 introduce our model of institutions, and Section 5 introduces
the dynamic social network. Related work and conclusions end the paper.
2 Running example: the Government Scenario
The government scenario models the relations among ministers, where the prime
minister has more powers than the other ministers, who have powers according
to their domain. At the non-institutional level, a minister needs a ministerial car
if she has to travel in town, she has to ask to the suitable office if she needs a
translation service, she has to ask to the office of public relations to set a press
conference if she needs to release a press statement, she has to contact the office
with the job to update web site and to ask it to do the changes if she needs
the publication on the web site of a particular office of new information, and
so on. Each item can be modeled as a goal of the minister and the agents on
which she depends to achieve her goals. For example, she depends on the office
of public relations to achieve the goal to program a press conference. Together,
these dependencies can be modeled as a social network.
From an institutional point of view, the government structure is hierarchical,
in the sense that the Prime Minister has more powers that of all the other minis-
ters, and the ministers have more powers than deputy-ministers. Consequently,
the ministers depend on the prime minister. If the Prime Minister delegates to
the foreign secretary some diplomatic topic, then all the other ministers and
the secretaries have to refer to the foreign secretary regarding this topic. Like-
wise, the Prime Minister can also remove a delegated topic again, for example
if there is a case of uncorrect behavior, taking her delegations ad interim. From
this moment, it will be the Prime Minister to which the other ministers have
to refer. Ministers also depend on each other. These institutional dependencies
among ministers is typically given by authorizations. For example, the minis-
ter of transport needs an authorization from the minister of infrastructures to
bridge a river, or the minister of public works needs funding from the minister
of finance to call for tenders to build the bridge. These examples show how a
minister M1 having a goal G1 depends on minister M2 to achieve it to have the
authorization.
The institutional powers of the Prime Minister can create new dependencies
among ministers. His institutional powers are that he can give a permission to
the other ministers to do something, for example the permission to be absent to
a council of ministers for serious reasons, and he can create obligations to other
ministers, for example, the Prime Minister can oblige the minister of transports
to present a document within a precise date. If the Prime Minister creates such
an obligation, then he may create also a dependency of the minister to other
ministers to obtain the document. Moreover, consider the example in which the
minister of Transports depends on the minister of Infrastructure to have the
authorization to start to build a new road. If the minister of Infrastructure is
under investigation for corruption and then he is removed from his role of minis-
ter, then the Prime Minister can take the office of the minister of Infrastructure
and so all his powers. In this case, the minister of Transports depends on the
Prime Minister to obtain his authorization to start building the road.
3 Social Viewpoints for Dynamic Dependence Networks
In our model introduced in [3], four views are defined to describe a multiagent
system: the agent view, the power view, the dynamic dependence view and the
coalition view. While the agent view represented the agents of the systems, their
goals and the actions that they can perform to achieve these goals, the power
view, based on the concept of social power introduced by Castelfranchi [8], in-
troduced conditional goals, such as those goals that can be added by an agent to
another one. We defined the dynamic dependence view as an abstraction of the
power view, represented by a set of dependencies that can be added thanks to
existence of conditional goals. Abstracting from the dynamic dependence view,
we defined the coalition view representing a coalition as a set of dynamic depen-
dencies where each agent either creates a dependency or fulfills a goal.
In this model, the power to trigger a goal is distinguished from the power
to fulfill a goal. Due to the power to create goals, dependence relations are no
longer static, but they can be created by agents. We extended the dependence
networks developed by Conte and Sichman [11], following our previous results
in [7]. In the abstraction from the power view to a dynamic dependence network,
the creation of a dynamic dependency is based only on the power to create goals.
In other models, creating a dependency can also be due to creation of new skills
of agents. For formal details, see [3].
These four views can be applied to our running example since every minister
has a set of private goals, beliefs and abilities and, according to the actions he can
perform he has the power to see to a number of goals, his or of the other agents.
Conditional goals are represented in our scenario, for example, by the decision of
the Prime Minister to give to the minister of transports to present a document
within a precise date. In this case, the Prime Minister has the power to trigger
this particular goal. These conditional goals are the base of the change inside
the dependence networks, transforming it in a dynamic dependence network.
4 The Institutional View
A social structure is modeled as a collection of agents, playing roles regulated by
norms where “interactions are clearly identified and localized in the definition
of the role itself” [13]. The notion of role is notable in many fields of Artificial
Intelligence and, particularly, in multiagent systems where the role is viewed as
an instance to be adjoined to the entities which play the role.
The institutional view is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Institutional view (IV)). IV = 〈RL, IF,RG,X, igoals : RL→
2RG, iskills : RL → 2X , irules : 2X → 2IF 〉 consists of a set of role instances
RL, a set of institutional facts IF , a set of public goals attributed to roles, a
set of actions X, a function igoals that relates with each role the set of public
goals it is committed to, a function iskills that describes the actions each role
can perform, and a set of institutional rules irules that relates a set of actions
and the set of institutional facts they see to.
The institutional view assigns to each participant a set of public goals, de-
scribing what he can do, e.g. authorize to built a bridge, and should do, e.g. be
present at a council of ministers. Our scenario allows to enforce the behavior of
the agents in the institution, for example, by blocking them from making state-
ments contradicting facts, or by performing forbidden (virtual) actions, such as
e.g. embezzle public money.
The social reality is provided with two distinct views, the material one, called
the agent view in [3], and the institutional one that aims to regulate the be-
haviour of the agents. In a multiagent system each agent has a set of facts and
goals that the other agents cannot change since agents are autonomous, formally
presented in the agent view. Thanks to its existence inside a social structure, to
each agent is added also new sets of facts and goals called the institutional ones
and that can be viewed and also modified by the other agents as regards their
institutional role.
The agents start with their sets of personal goals and beliefs and, only after
their insertion inside a particular social structure they enlarge their sets of goals
and beliefs. In particular, the set of goals is enlarged with new normative goals
that represent the responsibilities of the agent inside its social structure while
the set of beliefs is enlarged with new normative beliefs representing the set of
constitutive norms of the systems, norms based on the collective acceptance of
the society representable by means of an institutional ontology.
An Institutional Social Network is a social network representing set of indi-
viduals regulated by norms and containing the application of social roles to each
individual involved.
5 Institutional Dynamic Dependence Networks
The passage from one institutional view to another one can be viewed as a
dynamic social dependence network composed by all the social dependence net-
works coupled with the different institutional views. The main changes, that can
occur to the institutional view to make it dynamic and pass from an institutional
view to another one, are the addition or deletion of an igoal, of an iskill and
of an irule. These additions and deletions change the number of dependencies
and what agents are involved in them, passing from a social dependence network
to another one. This change can be represented by means of dynamic social de-
pendence networks. We extend the definition of dynamic dependence network
proposed in [3] with the possibility not only to add dependencies between agents
but also to remove them. Dynamic dependence networks are defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Dynamic Social Dependence Networks (DDN)). A dy-
namic social dependence network is a tuple 〈A,G, dyndep−, dyndep+〉 where:
– A is a set of agents and G is a set of goals.
– dyndep− : A× 2A × 2A → 22
G
is a function that relates with each triple of a
agent and two sets of agents all the sets of goals in which the first depends on
the second, unless the third deletes the dependency. The static dependencies
are defined by dep(a,B) = dyndep−(a,B, ∅).
– dyndep+ : A× 2A × 2A → 22
G
is a function that relates with each triple of a
agent and two sets of agents all the sets of goals on which the first depends
on the second, if the third creates the dependency.
The following definition introduces measures for existing dependencies and
achieved goals. The overall value assigned to each dependence network is the
ratio among the total number of goals that can be achieved by the agents of the
network and the total number of dependencies among these agents.
Definition 3 (Measures).
– Number of goals that are achieved inside the network.
• nsg : |S| where S = {G1, G2, ..., Gn} ∀Gi=1,...,n ∈ dep(A1, A2, Gi)
– Number of dependencies inside the network.
• nd : |D| where D = {dep1, dep2, ..., depn} ∀depi=1,...,n ∈ DN = 〈A,G, depi〉.
– The goals-dependencies ratio is defined as:
• GD − ratio = nsg
nd
with nsg ≤ nd.
Since a dynamic social dependence network is a superimposition of a number
of dependence networks, we define a∆GD−ratio that expresses how much changes
the ratio between the number of achieved goals and the number of dependen-
cies among the different dependence networks composing a dynamic dependence
network.
Example 1 illustrates the addition of an irule and of an iskill by role instance
Pm (Prime Minister). In the first case, the Prime Minister adds a new irule, that
joins the institutional action ixN with the institutional goal pgN , that it allows
to achieve. Since the minister able to perform the institutional action ixN is the
minister of transport (Tm) and the two ministers, infrastructure (Im) and finance
(Fm), have the institutional goal pgN , there is the setting of two new dynamic
dependencies. In the second case, the Prime Minister adds a new institutional
iskill ixe to the minister of finance that allows the creation of a new dynamic
dependence in which the Prime Minister depends on the minister of finance to
achieve the institutional goal pg5, allowed by ixe.
Example 1. Consider the following additions:
– Role Pm adds to the institutional view a new irule: IV → IV + {irules ∪
{{ixN}, {pgN}}} where {pgN} ⊆ igoals(Im) and {pgN} ⊆ igoals(Fm) and
{ixN} ⊆ iskills(Tm) then dep2 = dep + dyndep
+(Im, Tm,Pm, {pgN}) +
dyndep+(Fm, Tm,Pm, {pgN}) and nsg2 = nsg1 + 1 and nd2 = nd+ 2;
– Role Pm adds to the institutional view also a new iskill: IV → IV +
{iskills ∪ {Fm, {ixe}}} where irules(K, {pg5}) and ability({pg5}) = {ixe}
such that {pg5} ⊆ K and {pg5} =⊆ igoals(Pm) then
dep2 = dep+ dyndep
+(Pm,Fm,Pm, {pg5}) and nsg2 = nsg + 1 and nd2 =
nd+ 1;
Example 2 represents the application of the two additions on a dynamic social
dependence network, as shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. DDN of Example 2 where dotted arcs represent new dependencies.
Example 2. Consider the following dynamic social dependence network:
1. Agents A = {T, I, F, L, P} and Goals G = {pg1, pg2, pg3, pg4, pg5, pgN};
2. – dep({I}, {P}) = {{pg1}}: agent I depends on agent P to achieve goal
{pg1};
– dep({T}, {I}) = {{pg4}}: agent T depends on agent I to achieve goal
{pg4};
– dep({L}, {I, F}) = {{pg2}}: agent L depends on agents I, F to achieve
goal {pg2};
– dep({T}, {P,L}) = {{pg4}}: agent T depends on agents P,L to achieve
goal {pg4};
– dep({I}, {F}) = {{pg1}}: agent I depends on agent F to achieve goal
{pg1};
– dep({F}, {P}) = {{pg3}}: agent F depends on agent P to achieve goal
{pg3};
– dyndep+({I, F}, {T}, {P}) = {{pgN}}: agents I, F depend on agent T
to achieve goal {pgN} if it is created by agent P ;
– dyndep+({P}, {F}, {P}) = {{pg5}}: agent P depends on agent F to
achieve goal {pg5} if it is created by agent P ;
3. The following measures show that, thanks to an increase of the number of
dependencies, also the number of achieved goals increases: GD− ratio1 =
4
8
and GD − ratio2 =
6
11
with nsg ≤ nd;
6 Related work
Sierra [12] introduces Electronic Institutions (EIs) providing the virtual analogue
of human organizations in which agents, playing different organizational roles,
interact to accomplish individual and organizational goals. Roles are defined as
patterns of behavior and the purpose of their normative rules is to affect the
behavior of agents by imposing obligations or prohibitions. Another approach
to EIs is given by [4]. They propose the use of 3D Virtual Worlds where an
institution is represented as a building where the participants are represented
as avatars and once they enter the building their actions are validated against
the specified institutional rules. The problem of dynamic institutions is treated
in [5] as an extension to EIs definition with the capability to decide in an au-
tonomous way how to answer dynamically to changing circumstances through
norm adaptation and changes in institutional agents.
As originally defined, dependence networks lack two ingredients: a normative
structure and a dynamic representation of networks of social structures. Norma-
tive multiagent systems provide agents with abilities to automatically devise
societies coordinating their behavior via obligations, norms and social laws [2].
The definition of power of Boella [1] can be directly applied to the description of
the institutional view. Also the ability to achieve goals can be directly defined in
terms of facts, skills and goals attributed to roles following the definition given
in [1]. The presented formal model can be extended with obligations, as in [2].
Dependencies due to norms like obligations and permissions can be modeled
by means of social dependence networks as in [7], however, institutional powers
cannot be captured by the existing dependence networks formalism, since they
introduce a dynamic element. By exercising a power, an agent transforms a so-
cial dependence structure into a new one by adding or removing dependencies at
the institutional level of the social structure. Thus, in our paper, power is seen as
the base of the change differently from what expresses by Jones and Sergot [10]
and Grossi [9].
7 Conclusions
In this paper we show how to model the dynamics of dependence networks
between agents due to institutional change, where the institutions are used to
enforce the global behaviour of the society and to assure that the global goals
of the society are met. Roughly, the behavior of the agents leads to a set of
institutional facts, leading to the addition and removal of responsibilities and
powers associated with the roles. This change of the institutional goals and beliefs
of agents constitutes the dynamic behavior of the institution. The challenge of
this paper is to explain how on the one hand, agents are autonomous and, thus,
their goals and beliefs cannot change, but on the other hand, the dependences
between agents can change in an institution. This challenge is twofold. First,
we explain how we can change their institutional goals and beliefs, that is, the
responsibilities and powers associated with their roles. Second, we explain how
institutional goals are distinguished from the private goals and beliefs.
The change of institutional goals and beliefs of the agents is explained, first,
by an informal example based on an hypothetical government. Second, it is
explained by additions and deletions of dependencies between the agents using
dependence networks developed by Sichman and Conte [11]. Moreover, we define
measures to analyze dependence networks. As illustrated by the government
scenario, the uniform combined model of role playing agents with private and
institutional powers and goals provides an intuitive representation for dynamics
in terms of modification of the institution, and the network measures are used
to analyze this dynamics.
The distinction between changing institutional goals and beliefs and chang-
ing private goals and beliefs is based on the notion of institutional power. We
introduce the notion of institution based on the previously defined model of cog-
nitive agent of [3], associating to each agent a role instance with its institutional
goals, beliefs and capabilities. In [3] there is no definition of institution and the
changes are governed by power and are represented by conditional goals, so in
this paper we present an extension to the definition of dynamic dependence net-
work of [3] with also removal of dependencies. Due to the concept of institutional
power, the present paper shows the possibility to change the institutional goals
and beliefs of the agents maintaining agents’ autonomy.
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